‘Just Ridiculous’: A Famed Philosopher Takes on AI Consciousness by Steven Levy in WIRED:
WIRED: It’s been 52 years since you wrote “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” which has become an iconic paper about understanding consciousness in non-humans. Has the emergence of large language models altered your thinking?
THOMAS NAGEL: Like everyone, I’m tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness of these systems compared to the history of earlier AI. But the disposition of some philosophers to take seriously the question whether these things are conscious or might soon become conscious is just ridiculous. They are assuming that the physical substrate is irrelevant. They all think that the material conditions for consciousness can be given in functionalist terms.
Later, Levy pushes back, noting that he is interacting with Nagel as if he were conscious and asking whether, ultimately, it matters:
THOMAS NAGEL: It certainly matters. Suppose I were to encounter a being from outer space and was able to develop the possibility of communicating with it, and I genuinely didn’t know whether it was conscious or not. I could manage my relations with it by treating it as if it were conscious, but it would matter first to me whether I was really talking to somebody else or just using this as a way of getting it to do things. It would also matter to me very much whether I should worry about the interests of that being. If it’s conscious, it becomes part of the moral universe. If it’s not, it isn’t.
I am in the camp that thinks the idea that today's language models are conscious is absolute nonsense. Nagel's distinction is clarifying, if there were someone on the other end, then their interests would matter.